What’s next for New Caledonia?

September 1, 2025 • Web Admin •
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What’s next for New Caledonia?

WHY should we take the French engagement vis-à-vis the Blue Pacific in general (and Fiji in particular) seriously?

The French leader took advantage of the last United Nations Ocean Conference (UNOC) and the 6th Pacific-France summit to hold bilateral meetings with the seven heads of State and government from the Pacific Island Countries (PIC).

And it is a deep-rooted, not a one-off, initiative in the history, geography, and culture of France.

In the long term, this engagement follows De Gaulle’s call in Mexico in 1964 (to move forward, “hand in hand” with the rising South, in a challenging bipolar world) and his speech in Phnom Penh in 1966: “[France] is determined to avoid, under any circumstances and whatever happens, being automatically involved in the potential expansion of the [Vietnam War] and to maintain its freedom of action.”

Echoing this, French President Emmanuel Macron referenced the speech at the Shangri-La Dialogue and
reaffirmed: “You do not want to be confrontational with China. We do share the same approach. (…) De-risking, no confrontation, but clearly strategic autonomy.” In the same vein, Macron’s recent statements on climate change (like the opposition to deep-sea mining) also reflected Chirac’s warning at the 2002 World Summit: “Our house [the world] is burning down and we’re blind to it.”

Besides history, geography provides consistency in French diplomacy. For instance, the often-overlooked interest of French presidents in the environment and the (Global) South(s) is linked to their focus on the sea. It is not widely known that France manages the second-largest Exclusive Economic Zone in the world and that Paris administers (in various ways) small islands in every ocean.

Thus, it is not surprising that Macron recently travelled to archipelagos from Indianoceania to Insulindia.

While Indonesia serves as a key anchor point (and even a priority partner) in Southeast Asia, alongside Singapore, Fiji could fulfill a similar role in the Blue Pacific, together with Papua New Guinea (PNG), as part of diplomatic initiatives to prioritise small island developing states nearby. For instance, Suva is now the
first Pacific partner to receive advanced observation drones from France.

Today, Macron’s innovation is to refer, firstly, to the 1955 Bandung Conference, as he did in Singapore last May, rather than relying on grand gestures or French nationalism, which might be perceived as arrogance. Interestingly, he views this Conference not as a protest movement but as a step towards universalism, aimed at addressing the risk of “division between the two superpowers” and promoting a world order founded on international law instead of quests for hegemony.

Secondly, alongside his call for a Paris-New Delhi-Canberra axis in 2018 and initiatives toward Japan, he appears to enthusiastically engage with non-Quad/AUKUS/G7 members (and long-time “humiliated” states according to Professor Badie): Comoros and Mauritius in the Indian Ocean last April; Indonesia, Vietnam, and Singapore last May; PNG and Vanuatu in 2023. Furthermore (though this may be an overstatement!), his widely reported walkabouts in these Indo-Pacific countries, and among welcoming crowds, could be interpreted as support for UN “human security”, focusing on individuals beyond the more traditional, solely military- and state centred security.

Lastly, he acknowledged the need to clarify the misunderstood concept of a geopolitical “third way” (not a third “block”).

Thereafter, a potential development arising from this dual interest in strategic autonomy and maritime concerns, combined with Macron’s push for “a coalition of countries that will not be bullied (…), that will protect the global commons of nature”, could see France advocating for regional centralities, like the burgeoning Pacific-led regionalism. In this pursuit, after attending the 5th Summit of the Indian Ocean Commission (IOC) in April and visiting the Secretariat of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the next stop was further east, engaging with Pacific countries (even if the meeting took place in Nice). The final declaration called for “the implementation of regional Pacific-led security arrangements”.

To support this, following the installation in Nouméa of the French Permanent Representative to the Secretariat of the Pacific Regional Environment Programme (SPREP) and the Pacific Community (SPC), as well as the opening of the French embassy in Suva and the appointment of the first French Defence Attaché in Suva, some new deputy Defence Attachés will be sent to the region.

However, New Caledonia is the big Caillou (stone) in the French shoe. This is why the last talks on this matter in Paris were critical. After the French students in June, this was Macron’s turn and his final test. In his opening speech, Macron pronounced the taboo words “associated state”; but he also considered “a status quo” or “a broad autonomy”.

His private secretary, Patrice Faure, who was also a High Commissioner in Nouméa, assisted the Minister for Overseas in the negotiations. After managing both leftists and rightists in his successive cabinets, it seems that Emmanuel Macron also reconciled independence supporters and loyalists around a hybrid constitutional model.

New Caledonia offers the French president a unique opportunity to translate his recent speeches into actions. Pacific Islanders are attentive and ready to take him at his word. The issue is not only a local but
regional one, as it is time for the Caillou to be not a stone in the domestic shoe, but a brick in the Pacific-led regionalism, against bipolarisation and the rise of the sea level.