Subject to change: Options for Fiji Electoral reform

April 29, 2025 • Web Admin •
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Subject to change: Options for Fiji Electoral reform

Many senior politicians in Fiji believe that the country’s electoral system cannot be changed without simultaneously amending the 2013 Constitution. If accurate, that would be a major dilemma because amending the 2013 Constitution requires not only the support of 75% of MPs but also 75% of all registered voters in a referendum.

Fortunately, it is not correct. It is based on a misconception. There is scope for some significant changes in Fiji’s electoral law by an ordinary act of parliament that would remedy at least some of the major defects of the present system.


The reason so many in Fiji have misinterpreted the law and concluded that the electoral system is cast in stone is because of a misreading of the 2013 Constitution and because of unfamiliarity with the many other types of open list proportional system that exist elsewhere in the world.


The Fiji 2013 Constitution does, for better or worse, require the retention of the ‘multi-member open list system of proportional representation’.

Fiji’s Electoral Commission, as well as the Multinational Observer Reports on the 2014, 2018 and 2022 elections, have all stated that the 2013 Constitution requires that system to be operated in a single national constituency. This is wrong. What that Constitution actually says is that ‘the election of members of Parliament is by a multi-member open list system of proportional representation, under which each voter has one vote, with each vote being of equal value, in a single national electoral roll comprising all the registered voters’ (2013 Constitution S. 53 (1)).


But a ‘single national electoral roll’ does not mean ‘a single national constituency’. It is a reference to an electoral register that uses a ‘common roll’, one that departs from the pre-2006 coup practice of using communal rolls in which ethnic Fijians, Fiji Indians, General Voters, and Rotumans voted separately.

Prior to the deliberations on the 2013 Constitution, then-military commander and Prime Minister,
Frank Bainimarama set out a list of ‘non-negotiable’ provisions for the new constitution that included the ‘elimination of ethnic voting’, by which he meant ditching of the old racially reserved ethnic rolls. These communal rolls were initially introduced under British colonial rule in the late 1920s.


It is perfectly possible to have a ‘single national electoral roll’ with multiple constituencies. Nearly all countries which use open list proportional representation do not have one district for the entire nation.

The only countries that use open list systems in single nationwide districts are Holland, Kosovo, San Marino, and the Slovak Republic. Holland opted for a single nationwide district in 1917 because political
leaders at that time wanted a highly proportional system, but Fiji defeats that objective by simultaneously requiring a 5% threshold.

Parties or independents that do not reach the 5% threshold get no seats whatsoever. That makes the system much less proportional because the big parties get a share of seats that is larger than their share of votes.


In the earlier March draft of the 2013 Constitution, there was a four-constituency model proposed, with separate constituencies for the Western, Central, Northern, and Eastern Divisions. Shifting to such an arrangement would not breach the 2013 Constitution.

In a four-constituency model, it would be possible to modify the ballot paper to show not only candidates but also parties and party symbols. One of the major objections to the current system has concerned the obscure numbers-only ballot paper.

Under the present system, the ballots are primarily counted by party. Only after the party tallies are calculated do the individual tallies decide which candidates win seats. It makes sense to make the party more clearly visible on the ballot paper.


Some critics argue that the present system is unfair because parties depend on a ‘rock star’ candidate to obtain a huge number of nationwide votes and then less well-known candidates get elected on the coat-tails of that national leader. In a three- or four-constituency model, national leaders would (for better or worse) be confined to one of several smaller constituencies.


Above all, many critics object to the current system because it severs any link between Members of Parliament and specific geographical areas. Under all of Fiji’s earlier systems, there were lots of single member districts, meaning that citizens could know exactly who their MP was, and they could look at that MP to solve local-level problems.


It would not be possible to return to single-member districts without amending the Constitution, but most electoral specialists think Fiji is better off with a proportional representation system. Such systems make the highly ethnicised two-party polarisation witnessed both under the 1970 and 1997 Constitutions less likely. Single-member district systems, like first-past-the-post or the alternative vote, are those with districts which only elect one member.

You cannot have a proportional representation system if you only elect one member. In the Fiji context, such single-member district systems encourage a ‘winner takes all’ contest between two ethnic parties.

With a multiple constituency system, Fiji could have a closer relationship between its MPs and their constituents.

For example, with the present 55 MPs, one could potentially have eleven five-member constituencies, or three or four bigger constituencies. It would not require nearly as many votes to reach the 5% threshold if constituencies were smaller, so the system would be less unfair to smaller parties or independents. The country could retain the advantages of proportionality but simultaneously strengthen the accountability of MPs to specific districts.


Those who argue that such a reform could not be undertaken within the confines of the 2013 Constitution are either misreading the Constitution or else pulling the wool over people’s eyes.