Strengthening SPNFZ: nuclear entanglement or nuclear free?

July 28, 2025 • Web Admin •
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Strengthening SPNFZ: nuclear entanglement or nuclear free?

FORTY years ago, on 6 August 1985, the Pacific Islands Forum adopted the Treaty of Rarotonga for a South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone (SPNFZ).

At a time of heightened nuclear build-up in the 1980s, the Nuclear Free and Independent Pacific movement campaigned for Pacific governments to take bold initiatives. This led to the signing of the treaty at the 1985 Forum meeting in Rarotonga, Cook Islands, to establish a nuclear weapons free
zone across the South Pacific.

Today, as we face a new nuclear confrontation and the Forum proposes an “Ocean of Peace”, will Pacific leaders now act to strengthen SPNFZ?

In three short years, regional conflicts have brought us to the edge of nuclear catastrophe – from the war in Ukraine to the India-Pakistan Kashmir conflict, and now the Israeli and US strikes on Iran’s nuclear sites and infrastructure. All three conflicts have involved one or other of the nine nuclear armed states. All have resulted from pre-emptive action by nuclear-armed states, bypassing the need for substantive prior diplomatic negotiations and United Nations approval under international law.

The recent US pre-emptive strike on Iranian nuclear facilities on 21 June brings us even closer to nuclear
conflict, risking Iran’s withdrawal from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and an unravelling of the global non-proliferation regime. Beyond this, the current rivalry between the United States and China poses the future danger that the whole Asia-Pacific region could be engulfed in nuclear war, possibly over Taiwan.

Building a nuclear “deterrent” or calling on a nuclear ally to provide a “nuclear umbrella” are often proposed as solutions to such threats. But acquiring your own nuclear weapons creates a domino effect, where neighboring countries feel the need to acquire their own nuclear deterrent. For countries that seek to rely on a nuclear “umbrella” from a nuclear-armed ally, the likely risk is that such an ally might believe that it can fight a nuclear war on your territory rather than on its own, or use your territory to launch an attack on an adversary, automatically making your territory a nuclear target.

There is a real danger of this with the 2021 AUKUS agreement between Australia, the United States, and the United Kingdom. Under AUKUS, Australia hopes to acquire a fleet of nuclear-powered submarines that will work closely alongside US forces, tracking Chinese submarines. This could potentially facilitate a nuclear first strike on China during a conflict over Taiwan.

In contrast, six regions of the world have chosen another path, seeking a safer and more secure way of dealing with nuclear threats. Across the southern hemisphere, countries have established regional nuclear-weapon-free zones where nuclear weapons are banned, and the stationing of nuclear weapons by external states is outlawed. Today, there are nuclear weapons free zones covering Latin America, Africa,
Southeast Asia, Central Asia, Mongolia, and our own region, the South Pacific.

The 1985 South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone (SPNFZ), negotiated through the South Pacific Forum, bans all regional states from acquiring nuclear weapons or permitting the stationing of nuclear weapons on their territory. The Treaty of Rarotonga obligates external nuclear powers not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against the region, nor to test nuclear weapons within the zone. Three protocols to the treaty have been signed and ratified by China, Russia, the United Kingdom, and France, but only signed by the United States, which has refused to ratify the SPNFZ protocols.

During the Rarotonga treaty negotiations in the 1980s, Australia sought to accommodate its ANZUS ally, the United States. The Australian government insisted that each member state should have the right to allow transit rights to nuclear armed vessels and aircraft through its ports and territory. At the time, several Pacific Island states (including Vanuatu and Papua New Guinea) sought tighter controls in the treaty to prevent de-facto stationing of nuclear weapons under the fig leaf of “transit rights”.

Under its AUKUS partnership, Australia is now permitting nuclear-capable US submarines to use West Australian ports for lengthy periods. US nuclear-capable aircraft (including B2 and B52H bombers) are rotated or transited through Tindal Air Base in Northern Australia. The United States maintains a “neither-confirm-nor-deny” (NCND) policy. However, it has already announced plans to deploy non-strategic nuclear armed cruise missiles on submarines and aircraft that will be using Australian bases.

In the case of Australia’s proposed AUKUS submarine fleet, the current government has pledged that its submarines will not be nuclear-armed. However, given the uncertainty associated with the US NCND policy, any future conflict between the United States and nuclear adversaries may mean that other nations would see that American use of bases in Australia would make them legitimate targets for nuclear attack, with devastating consequences for the whole region.

It now seems urgent that SPNFZ be strengthened if the Pacific region is to avoid becoming entangled in a catastrophic nuclear war between external nuclear powers.

First and foremost, Article 5 of the Treaty of Rarotonga should be tightened to prevent any transiting nuclear-capable platforms from introducing nuclear weapons into the territory of member states. Clause 2 of Article 5 should be amended to require that any vessel or aircraft visiting regional ports or airfields not carry nuclear weapons. In the event of a failure to declare that such platforms are not nuclear-armed, the Treaty should require mandatory verification inspections.

Secondly, given heightened tensions in the Asia-Pacific region, the Treaty should be amended to require mandatory periodic reviews, perhaps on an annual basis. This review process would better ensure compliance and respect for the non-nuclear status of the region. The region could establish a specialist control and verification body, similar to OPANAL, established under Latin America’s Tlatelolco Treaty.

Thirdly, to reduce the possibility of the region becoming a nuclear target in the event of external nuclear conflicts, the Treaty should include a further provision binding external nuclear states not to use any part of the SPNFZ region to launch nuclear weapons against any other region (such as ballistic missile submarines deployed in the South Pacific firing at targets in Asia).

Fourthly, the Treaty should include provisions for coordination and liaison with other regional nuclear-free zones, and collaboration with NWFZ secretariats across the southern hemisphere, as well as with the new UN Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW).

This nuclear abolition treaty has been ratified by 73 states, including 11 Forum members and most ASEAN nations (including Indonesia, Philippines, Thailand, Cambodia, Laos, Vietnam, and Malaysia).